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The Future of Transferable
Development Rights in the
Supreme Court
BY LINDA A. MALoNE*
INTRODUCTION

Despite growing utilization of transferable development rights
(TDRs) to insulate land use measures from taking challenges,'
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether TDRs
can salvage government regulation that would otherwise constitute a taking of private property without just compensation. The
saving grace of TDRs is that they may permit an owner of
property that has been restrictively zoned to recoup any economic loss on the restricted property by selling the property's
severed development rights to receiving properties authorized for
increased density of development. 2 In theory at least, the use of

• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas Law School, Fayetteville.
B.A. 1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; LL.M. 1984, University of
Illinois College of Law.
1 See Duncan, Toward a Theory of Broad-based Planning for the Preservation
of Agricultural Land, 24 NAT. REsoURcEs J. 61, 121-22 (1984). For an overview of
farmland preservation techniques, including TDRs, see NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDs
STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981). See generally Keene, A Review of Governmental Policies
and Techniques for Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. REsoURCES J. 119 (1979); Myers,
Farmland Preservation in a Democratic Society: Looking to the Future, 1981-82 AGRIC.
L.J. 605.
For a thorough discussion of the taking clause, see F. BossELMAN, D. CALLIES &
J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE (1973).
2 For an analysis of the mechanics of various TDR schemes, see Merriam, Making
TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1978); Torres, Helping Farmers and Saving Farmland,
37 OKLA. L. REv. 31, 38-45 (1984).
A preservation technique related to the transfer of development rights is the
technique of purchase of development rights. In such a program the development rights
are purchased by a local planning agency to hold in abeyance indefinitely (in what has
been referred to as "land banking") or until a decision is made to release them for
further development. E. ROBERTS, THE LAW AND THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL
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TDRs precludes taking clause objections. Restricted landowners
cannot claim that the restrictive zoning has deprived them of the
economic value of the restricted property, since any economic
loss can be compensated through sale of the TDRs. In this way,
TDRs have proven to be useful as a tool for preservation of
properties-such as farmland, landmarks, historic sites and open
space-which are threatened by approaching development.
The growing popularity of using TDRs as a farmland and
historic site preservation device makes it quite likely that the
Supreme Court soon will find it necessary to face the constitutional issues that TDRs pose. A likely factual scenario for the
Court would be as follows: A landowner owns two or more
contiguous parcels of property in an area of growing development, and the land has been zoned for commercial or residential
use. One of the parcels of property is undeveloped-that is, the
property has no commercial development and little or no residential development-and, in that state of undevelopment, the
property provides agricultural, aesthetic or ecological benefit to
the rapidly developing community. The county zoning board
then rezones the landowner's property so that the undeveloped
parcel must remain undeveloped, but the landowner's other contiguous parcels of property are to retain the same density of
development as under the prior zoning ordinances. To compensate for the restrictions on the undeveloped parcel, the county
zoning ordinances provide that the parcel's unused development
rights may be transferred: (a) to the owner's other contiguous
and noncontiguous property or (b) to other designated, contiguous or noncontiguous lots under different ownership. The landowner subsequently submits a development plan for the

LAND 76-77 (1982). Ironically, in light of recent Supreme Court opinions which reflect
unfavorably on the future of TDRs, the Supreme Court decided a case this term which
substantiates claims of a public purpose justifying the use of eminent domain for
purchase of development rights. In Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984), the Court found a valid public use for state condemnation of private land in
order to reduce concentration of ownership. The Court held that, where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a
compensated taking will not be prohibited by the public use clause of the fifth amendment. /d. at 2330.
For other legal challenges to TDRs in an agricultural context, see Appeal of John
MacEachran, 438 A.2d 302 (N.H. 1981); Louthan v. King County, 617 P.2d 977 (Wash.
1980). See generally Peterson & McCarthy, Farmland Preservation by Purchase of
Development Rights: The Long Island Experiment, 26 DE PAULL. REv. 447 (1978).
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undeveloped parcel to the zoning board, but the board disapproves the plan in accordance with the newly passed ordinances.
The landowner then files suit in state court claiming damages
for inverse condemnation and seeks a declaratory judgment that
the ordinances have effectuated a taking of property without
just compensation.
Assuming for purposes of the hypothetical that the restrictions imposed on the undeveloped parcel deprive it of all or
almost all of its economic value,3 a court faced with a challenge
to the validity of the ordinance could take any one of several
approaches. First, the court could compare the value of all of
the landowner's contiguous property to the value of the TDRs
and conclude that the restrictions on the one parcel do not
constitute a taking because they do not sufficiently deprive the
landowner of the economic return on the property as a whole.
In reaching such a conclusion, the court might even take into
consideration the owner's noncontiguous property on which the
TDRs might be used. Secondly, the court could focus only upon
the economic detriment to the restricted parcel, and conclude
that the conferral of the TDRs salvages the constitutionality of
the ordinance from a taking challenge even if the ordinance
would otherwise be a taking of the restricted par~el. Alternatively, again focusing only on the restricted parcel, the court
could find, without considering the value of the TDRs, that
there had been a taking. The court then would have to determine
whether the TDRs satisfy the constitutional requisites for just
compensation.
The foregoing hypothetical would raise two as yet unresolved
issues of fundamental importance to every TDR scheme: (1)
What is the appropriate unit of property in relation to which a
taking is to be evaluated? and (2) Is the value of TDRs relevant
to whether a taking has occurred or relevant only to whether
just compensation has been provided once a taking has been
found?
A TDR scheme poses unique problems in defining the unit
of property which is allegedly being taken. In the usual zoning
situation, the unit or units of property for taking purposes will

This assumption is necessary in that otherwise there would be no taking without
consideration of the TDRs, and, therefore, no need for a court to evaluate the legal
effect of the TDRs on the taking or just compensation issues.
3
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be determined to a large extent by the challenged action of the
zoning authority. If the parcels are separately rezoned and/or
treated as separate parcels by the zoning authority, the reviewing
court is more likely to determine the taking issue separately with
regard to each parcel, even if the landowner is claiming that
both parcels have been taken. 4 If the landowner claims that only
one of the contiguous parcels is being taken, however, the courts
differ as to whether to consider the effect on the landowner's
contiguous property as a whole or on the restricted parcel only.s
The TDR situation is further complicated by the fact that
the restricted parcel is economically and administratively linked
to the receiving area for the TDRs, which may be contiguous or
noncontiguous parcels and which may be under the same or
different ownership from that of the restricted parcel. 6 In evaluating the economic effect of the zoning on the landowner's
"property," should contiguous nonreceiving parcels under the
same ownership be part of the property? Further, should contiguous and/or noncontiguous receiving parcels under the same
ownership be part of the property?
Another question is whether the value of the TDRs should
be relevant initially in determining whether a taking has occurred, or if it should be relevant only in deciding whether just
compensation has been provided if a taking is otherwise found.

• See, e.g., City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), reviewed denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1983); Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445
A.2d 46, 68-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County,
581 P.2d 50,61 (Or. 1978). See also American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin,
653 F.2d 364, 371 (9th Cir. 1981) (until owner submitted plan, impossible to determine
whether property was to be treated as one parcel or as two).
5
Compare American Dredging Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
404 A.2d 42, 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (restricted area held to comprise only
30/o of total property and Multnomah County v. Howell, 496 P.2d 235, 238 (Or. Ct. App.
1972) (though 4 of plaintiff's 9 lots were subject to restriction, court considered them
one piece of property) with Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (beachfront and uplands of tract treated as two
different tracts for purposes of allocating compensating densities), appeal dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 53 (1983). See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl.
1981) (permitting requirements only covered portions of tracts), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1017 (1982); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State Dep't of Ecology, 565 P.2d 1162, 1163
(Wash. 1977) (restrictions did not apply to 300Jo of property).
• See Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use
Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35, 50 (1974).
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TDRs defy easy categorization as either regulation or compensation. TDRs' hybrid character is reflected in the disagreement
within the Supreme Court as to which of the two prongs of the
taking test triggers consideration of TDRs.7 Compounding this
disagreement, it appears that the Court is now less inclined than
in the past to look at the landowner's economic situation as a
whole in evaluating whether a taking has occurred. The focus
may no longer be on how many "sticks" out of the bundle of
rights known as property have been taken, but on which one or
ones have been taken. Therefore, both the owner's vestigial
rights following the governmental action and the extensiveness
of the landowner's other property are less important to the
analysis of taking. Instead, the result is concentration on the
"nature" of the right invaded and its economic value to the
landowner. Under the emerging view, the deprivation of one
property right alone is more likely to result in a taking if that
property right is economically significant, but the requisite degree of significance has yet to be delineated. 8 Thus far, the right
to exclude others for competitive advantage has been of sufficient economic significance that its deprivation has twice been
held by the Court to constitute a taking. 9 These cases cause one
to wonder if the right to develop can be far behind.
This Article will examine the Supreme Court's recent taking
decisions to determine, from a taking perspective, what guidance
they might provide as to the redeeming features of TDRs. 10 The
Article will then identify the most likely situation in which the
Court will have to determine the ability of a TDR scheme to
withstand a taking challenge. 11 After examining the problem of
defining the appropriate property unit for a taking challenge,
the analysis will turn to whether the Court will consider the

See text accompanying notes 18-38 infra.
• See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 39-43, 55-64 infra.
10
See text accompanying notes 14-64 infra. Scholarly writings on the constitutionality of TORs as a general matter are extensive. For a basic introduction to the debate,
compare Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J.
75 (1973-74) and Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1021
(1975) with Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to
Professor Costonis, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 799 (1976) and Note, The Unconstitutionality
of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1974-75).
11 See text accompanying notes 65-107 infra.
7
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availability of TDRs to be relevant to the taking issue or to the
issue of what constitutes just compensation for the taking. 12
Regardless of how these questions are answered, the overall
taking issue will be determined by the economic viability of each
individual TDR scheme. This Article suggests that, in its evaluation of economic viability, the Court should be deferential to
the judgment of the planning entity under established constitutional doctrines of judicial review. 13
I.

Penn Central and its Progeny

In 1978 the Supreme Court upheld the application to the
Grand Central Terminal of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, rejecting in the process claims that this application
of the law had taken the owners' property without just
compensation14 and had arbitrarily deprived them of their property without due process of law . 15 To alleviate the economic
burden placed on landmark owners, the preservation law permitted affected owners to transfer their unusable development
rights in the landmark site to other proximate lots. 16 The Penn
Central decision triggered an optimistic flurry of innovative zoning techniques that frequently employed the transferability of
development rights to provide greater insulation against taking
challenges. But Penn Central actually posited relatively limited
reassurance for such zoning, and lower courts have had to grapple
with the Court's repeated admission that taking challenges entail
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. 17
Without reaching the issue of whether a TDR could be just
compensation, the Court in Penn Central did suggest that the
availability of a TDR might be of some significance in determining whether a taking has occurred. 18 The Penn Central Ter-

12
See text accompanying notes 107-66 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 167-75 infra.
14
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that private
property shall not be "taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNST.
amend. V. The fourteenth amendment has been held to impose the same restricton on
states and municipalities. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 107 (1978).
" See 438 U.S. 104.
16
Id. at 109.
17
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
18
See 438 U.S. at 137.
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minal had been designated a landmark by the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission, and, at that time, Penn
Central did not seek judicial review of the designation. 19 Penn
Central subsequently leased the air rights above th~ buildi~g for
construction of an office building. 20 The Commission, however,
disapproved two submitted plans for an office building more
than fifty stories high because of the plans' adverse effects on
the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features. 21 Under New York
City's zoning laws, owners of real property who had ~ot developed their property to the full extent permitted under applicable
zoning laws were allowed to petition for transfer of their development rights to other designated parcels of property. 22 The
Court noted that this right "enhances the economic position of
the landmark owner in one significant respect.' ' 23
Following the Commission's disapprpval of the mpltistory
office plans, the Terminal owners filed spit, claiming an unlawful
taking and denial of due process, and seeking a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief and damages. The damages were for
the "temporary taking" which allegedly occurred between the
landmark designation date and the date when the restrictiops
from the landmark law would be lifted following the owners'
success in court. 24 The New York Court of Appeals refused to
recognize any "regulatory taking 11 clai:rp./5 and ultimately concluded that there was no due process violation because Penn
Central had not been deprived of a "reasonable return on [its]
investment in the [property].m6
On appeal, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when economic injury capsed by governmental action
requires compensation, and that each case necessitates "ad hoc,

at 115-16.
at 116.
at 117.
at 114-15.
at 113.
at 119.
at 121. In Penn Centrql, Justice Brennan noted that the Court does not
"embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physi~ control over a portion of a parcel." /d. at 123 n.25.
:u; ld. at 121.
/d.
"'!d.
21 /d.
22 /d.
:n /d.
"' !d.
25
ld.
19
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factual inquiries. " 27 The Court had little difficulty in determining
that the diminution in value of the property did not constitute
a taking within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, particularly in light of Penn Central's concession that
the property was still capable of earning a reasonable return. 28
In determining the diminution in value borne by Penn Central,
the Court refused to define the affected property as "air rights;"
it focused instead on the economic effects on the parcel as a
whole, that is, the city tax block designated as the landmark
site. 29 In reaching its holding, the Court addressed only briefly
the relevance of the TDRs to the taking issue:
[T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build
above the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they
have been denied all use of even those pre-existing air rights.
Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they
are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity
of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable
for the construction of new office buildings. Although appellants and others have argued that New York City's transferable
development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York
courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the
Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these rights
may well not have constituted "just compensation" if a "taking'' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants
and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation. 30

Having concluded that there was not a taking, the Court had
no need to address the issue of whether the TDRs would have
provided "just compensation" had a taking occurred.
Although the majority seemed more inclined to consider the
value of TDRs in relation to the taking issue, Justice Rehnquist
in his dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens,
took a different approach. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the

Id. at 124.
Id. at 128-29. This strategic concession on the central issue in the case has been
described by Professor Costonis as an inexplicable "boner of litigation strategy." Comment, 30 LAND UsE LAw & ZoNING DIG. 9, 428 (1978).
29
See 438 U.S. at 130-31.
30
Id. at 137 (footnote omitted).
27

28

1985]

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

767

landmark preservation ordinance had taken Penn Central property by restricting use of the property's air rights.Jl By singling
out individual landowners, as opposed to the constitutionally
acceptable zoning method of prohibiting certain uses over a
broad cross section of land, the ordinance failed to guarantee
landmark owners the " 'average reciprocity of advantage' " necessary to fall within the traditional "zoning" exception to the
taking prohibition. 32 In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist sharply
criticized the Court's vacillating suggestions that the restrictions
must have " 'an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of
the property,' " prevent " 'a reasonable return' " on the landowner's investment, or prohibit the property from being " 'economically viable' " to establish a taking. 33 The dissent was
specifically critical of any requirement that the property owner
be denied all reasonable return on the property. Rehnquist stressed
that the Court would not only have to define "reasonable return" for a variety of types of property, but would have to
define the particular property unit to be examined. 34 For example, the Court would have to distinguish the restricted parcel of
property itself from the air rights to the parcel and from all
contiguous parcels of property owned by the restricted landowner.
Nevertheless, Rehnquist would have remanded the case to
the New York Court of Appeals "for a determination of whether
TDRs constitute a 'full and perfect equivalent for the property
taken'. " 35 As to whether the TDRs are a "full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken, " 36 he considered as negative
factors the severely limited area to which transfer was permitted,
the complex procedures required to obtain a transfer permit, the
uncertain and contingent market value of the TDRs, and the
failure of the TDRs to reflect the value lost. 37 As a factor

See id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal-Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). For a critique of Justice Rehnquist's dissent utilizing the
Court's decisions prior to Penn Central, see Torres, supra note 2, at 56-61.
'' See 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
,. See id. (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
" Id. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
36 I d. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
37 See id. at 151 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
31

32
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favoring the TDRs as just compensation, Rehnquist acknowledged that Penn Central had been offered "substantial amounts"
for its TDRs. 38
After Penn Central there followed a series of cases in which
the character of the interference with the property right was
outcome-determinative of the taking issue. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 39 the Corps of Engineers claimed the government
had a navigational servitude40 on what had been a private lagoon,
which the owners had connected to the Pacific Ocean, with
Corps approval, in order to build an exclusive marina-based
community. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated
that the Court would decide the taking issue by examining "the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action." 41 The Court rejected the government's
claim that a navigational servitude existed. 42 Finding that public
access would result in an actual physical invasion of private
property by the government, Justice Rehnquist stated that impairment of the property owners' right to exclude others would
frustrate the owners' reasonable investment-backed expectations
and, therefore, constitute a taking. 43
In contrast, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 44 the
Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that shopping
center owners permit individuals to exercise their free speech
and petition rights in the shopping center despite the owners'
argument that they were being deprived of their property without
compensation. 45 In Prune Yard, as in Kaiser Aetna, the character
of the governmental action was a physical invasion of private
property. 46 Justice Rehnquist, again speaking for the Court,
suggested that deprivation of a right to exclude others by its

See id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
444 u.s. 164 (1979) .
.. A navigational servitude is a navigational easement giving the public a right of
free access. The majority opinion in Kaiser Aetna v. United States further outlines the
history of this concept. See id. at 175-76.
41
/d. at 175.
41
See id. at 179.
•, /d. at 179-80.
44
447 u.s. 74 (1980).
4
' See id. at 82-85.
46
See id. at 77.
38

39
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very nature is more likely to constitute a taking.47 In Prune Yard,
however, the Court refused to !md the physical invasion to be
dispositive because, not surprisingly, there was no showing that
the right to exclude others was important to the economic value
of the shopping center.48
The Court's emphasis on the character of the governmental
interference reached its peak in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 49 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, from
which Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White dissented, the
physical invasion resulting from a television· cable installed on
an apartment owner's roof, as authorized under New York law,
was held to constitute a taking of the apartment owner's property without compensation.50 Despite the minimal interference
by the cable in the owner's enjoyment of his property, the Court
held the physical invasion to be a "per se" taking of private
property.51 Thus, the character of the governmental action has
become, not merely a factor, but the only factor in finding a
taking when the governmental action is a physical invasion of
property.
This series of physical intrusion cases provides little direct
guidance as to the direction the Court will take after Penn
Central in evaluating TDR techniques. Indeed, the Court in
Loretto took care to distinguish between land use regulations
and physical intrusions in taking cases.52 These cases are instructive, however, in tracing the apparent "wooing away" of Justices
Stewart, White and Powell from the Penn Central majority to
Justice Rehnquist's views as expressed in his dissent in that case.

• 7 See id. at 82 .
... See id. at 83 .

•• 458

u.s. 419 (1982).

"' See id. at 421.
" See id. at 434-35.
"As Penn Central affirms, the Court has often upheld substantial regulation
of an owner's use of his own property where deemed necessary to promote
the public interest. At the same time, we have long considered a physical
intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious
character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish
that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent
physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, "the character
of the ,government action" not only is an important factor in resolving
whether the action works a taking but is determinative.

Id. at 426.
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In Penn Central Justice Rehnquist declined to determine whether
a taking had occurred by applying some gradation of economic
deprivation to some undefined unit of property as a whole. 53
Rehnquist thus refused to follow an approach in which the
owner's property as a whole would be examined to determine
whether the government action had an "unduly harsh" economic
impact, prevented "a reasonable return" on the owner's investment or kept the property from being "economically viable." 54
Rehnquist's approach, and the approach generally taken in
Kaiser Aetna and the cases which followed, is to first determine
which of the so-called "bundle of sticks" constituting property
has been taken (for example, the right to exclude others), and
then to determine how important that "stick" is to the use or
economic value of the property. If that property right is of an
as yet unspecified level of significance to the economic value or
use of the property, then its deprivation alone may constitute a
taking.
In contrast, the Penn Central majority would be more inclined to examine the entire bundle of sticks, (for example, the
full fee interest or all the landowner's contiguous property) and
refuse to find a taking unless some significant number of sticks
had been destroyed by the governmental action. The implications
for any land use regulation that severely restricts development
cannot be ignored. Following Justice Rehnquist's approach, the
denial of a right to develop one's property could be important
to the economic value of the property for the landowner. Thus,
the deprivation of a single important property right, one stick
in the bundle, could be a taking. Under the approach of the
Penn Central majority, deprivation of one property right alone
would rarely constitute a taking. The landowner would still have
use of all the property rights other than the right to develop,
and the only question would be whether the economic value of
the property as a whole had been destroyed. In sum, under
Justice Rehnquist's approach the nature of the property right
taken becomes more important than what property rights remain.

See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
,. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
53
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Although the majority and the dissenters were unable to
agree in Penn Central on the extent of economic deprivation
necessary to constitute a taking, the Court was able to agree on
some general guidelines in the recent case of Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Company. 55 In Monsanto, the Court determined that
under Missouri law trade secrets were property for purposes of
the fifth amendment's taking clause. 56 In addition to disclosing
some of the data to the public pursuant to the provisions of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 57
the Environmental Protecton Agency (EPA) had utilized trade
secret information submitted to it for pesticide registration by
Monsanto, a pesticide manufacturer, in order to evaluate other
pesticide manufacturers' applications for registration. 58
On behalf of a unanimous Court59 Justice Blackmun stated
that whether a governmental action has gone beyond "regulation" to a "taking" depends upon " 'the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment backed expectations,' " 60 a test first formulated in Penn Central. The Penn Central Court focused only
on the last factor as being so "overwhelming" under the facts
of that case as to be dispositive of the taking question. 61 According to the Monsanto Court, the explicit governmental guarantee of confidentiality in the 1972 amendments to FIFRA was
the basis for Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectation.62 The EPA's disclosure and utilization of the data de-

"
,.
,.,
,.

104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
See id. at 2874.
7 u.s.c. § 136 (1982).
104 S. Ct. at 2866-67.
59
Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at
2883. Justice O'Connor dissented only as to that portion of the Court's opinion which
concluded that Monsanto did not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that
the EPA would maintain the confidentiality of data submitted prior to the 1972 amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Id. at 288384.
60
Id. at 2875 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. at 83).
•• See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124.
61 Justice O'Connor dissented as to that portion of the court's opinion that
Monsanto had no expectation of confidentiality prior to the 1972 amendments to FIFRA.
Noting that, prior to 1972, FIFRA essentially was silent as to confidentiality, Justice
O'Connor concluded that agency practice, the Trade Secrets Act and the applicant's
reasonable expectations also made any disclosure of data prior to 1972 a taking of the
data. See 104 S. Ct. at 2883-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prived Monsanto of its "right to exclude others [which] is central
to the very definition of the property interest'' in a trade secret. 63
The essential economic value of the property right lay in the
competitive advantage-an advantage destroyed by disclosure of
the data; consequently, the remaining uses of the data were
"irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact" of the
EPA's action o'n Monsanto's property right. 64 For the first time
in a case not involving a physical invasion, the Court found that
the importance of the property interest invaded outweighed consideration of any remaining rights in the property.
II. THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR
THE COURT: OPEN SPACE ZONING AND TDRs

A.

Judicial Dodgeball and TDRs

In three cases, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 65 San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,66 and Aptos Seascape Corp.
v. County of Santa Cruz, 67 the Court skirted taking claims in
which TDRs played pivotal roles. In each case, zoning to preserve open space \vas tempered by conferral of TDRs on the
open space lots. The likelihood of such a case appearing before

Id. at 2878.
Id. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In Andrus, Justice Brennan
(writing for all of the justices except Chief Justice Burger who concurred) held that the
prohibition of the sale of eagle feathers as applied to traders in preexisting bird artifacts
was not a taking. The Court stated:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them .... In this
case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport
their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds .... [L]oss of
future profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim.
Id. at 65-66. It is difficult to see how the complete destruction of the exploitation value
of the bird artifacts for the traders is somehow less of an economic burden on them
than the loss of competitive advantage in the otherwise useful data is on Monsanto. The
Andrus opinion may be best explained as an opinion by Justice Brennan following the
Penn Central approach of focusing on how many ·of the entire "bundle of sticks" are
lost as opposed to Justice Rehnquist's approach of focusing on the economic significance
of the individual stick lost.
•, 447 u.s. 255 (1980).
66
450 u.s. 621 (1981).
67
188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct. App. 1982), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
63

64
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the Court has increased in light of several decisions invalidating
open space zoning on constitutional grounds. 68
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 69 the landowner had five acres
of open land with a view of San Francisco Bay. The land was
rezoned for a residential planned development and open space
zone, permitting one to five single family residences on the five
acre tract. 70 The owners, without seeking approval from the city
for any development, brought an inverse condemnation suit7 1
claiming that the ordinance itself prohibited development of the
land and therefore gave rise to a taking. 72 A unanimous Court,
speaking through Justice Powell, held there was no taking. 73
Powell noted that the ordinance on its face only limited development and neither prevented the best use of_ the land nor
extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership.74 Significantly, the Court did not address the California Supreme Court's
holding that an action for inverse condemnation could not be
the basis for damages but only for mandamus or declaratory
relief.75 Because the Court held that no taking had occurred, it
did not have to "consider whether a State may limit the remedies
available to a person whose land has been taken without just
compensation.' ' 76
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 77 the
Court again sidestepped the issue left open in Agins: whether a

61
See, e.g., Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1982); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963); Lemp v. Town Board of Islip, 394 N.Y.S.2d517 (App.
Div. 1977).
.. 447 u.s. 255.
70
!d. at 257.
'' The phrase "inverse condemnation" .generally describes a cause of action
against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover just
compensation for a "taking" of his property under the Fifth Amendment,
even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's
power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the government
entity. . . . In an "inverse condemnation" action, the condemnation is
"inverse" because it is the landowner, not the government entity, who
institutes the proceeding.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2.
n 447 U.S. at 258.
" See id. at 263.
" Id. at 260.
" See id. at 259.
76
Id. at 263.
77 450 u.s. 621.
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monetary remedy must be provided to a landowner whose property is allegedly taken by a regulatory ordinance. 78 As a possible
site for a nuclear power plant, the power company had purchased a 412-acre parcel, of which 214 acres were subsequently
rezoned from industrial/agricultural use to open space. 79 Claiming that the only beneficial use of the property was as an
industrial park that would be inconsistent with the open space
zoning, the company sought damages in inverse condemnation. 80
Although both the trial court and the California Court of Appeals awarded damages for a taking, the California Supreme
Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded in
light of its decision in Agins that monetary relief was unavailable
for a· regulatory taking. 81 On remand the California Court of
Appeals concluded that monetary relief was unavailable, but
also concluded that there were factual disputes yet to be resolved
on the underlying taking issue. 82 As a result, after the California
Supreme Court denied further review, the United States Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment.83 The
majority did, however, note that the constitutional issue, whether
the company was entitled to a monetary remedy, was "not to
be cast aside lightly.' ' 84 In his concurrence as to the absence of
a final judgment, Justice Rehnquist indicated that on the merits
he would agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, who had reached
the merits of the case. 85 In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan
stated that a government's exercise of its regulatory police power
can create a taking within the meaning of the taking clause and
that, in such circumstances, the Constitution would require just
compensation for the period beginning on the date the regulation
effected a taking and ending upon rescission or amendment of
the offensive regulation by the government entity. 86

78

See id. at 633.
/d. at 624-25.
80
!d. at 626.
8
' See id. at 627-28.
82
See id. at 629-30.
8
' See id. at 630.
84
!d. at 633.
8
' See id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J ., concurring).
86
!d. at 653 (Brennan, J ., dissenting). See generally Wright, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37 Aruc. L. REv. 612 (1984);
Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of Compensation in Land Use Regulatory Cases,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 621 (1983).
79
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In a recent case wherein the constitutionality of the land use
regulation turned on the availability of TDRs, the Court once
again dismissed the appeal for want of a final judgment. 87 In
the dismissed case, Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa
Cruz, 88 Seascape owned 110 acres, including forty acres of
benchlands and seventy acres of beachfront property. 89 The
property at the time of purchase was zoned residential with a
commercial hotel use allowed on one section of the benchlands.
The county, after Seascape's unsuccessful attempts to obtain
development approval, rezoned the property so that all of the
beachfront property was open space with development prohibited, and so that the benchlands were permitted one family
residence per 6000 square feet. 90 Seascape brought an action for
damages, inverse condemnation and declaratory relief against
the county, alleging that the rezoning had deprived it of all
reasonable use of its property. 91
The California Court of Appeals, relying on Agins, reversed
the trial court's award of inverse condemnation damages for a
regulatory taking. 92 Because the trial court had concluded that
there was a taking of property without just compensation, the
California Court of Appeals was left with Seascape's crossappeal to have the zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional
as a taking without just compensation. To resolve this issue, the
court was faced with one of the issues foreseen by Rehnquist in
his Penn Central dissent: defining the particular property unit
to be examined for determining the economic return left after
the purported taking. The alternatives posed to the Court as the
property unit were the seventy-acre beachfront parcel and the
110-acre parcel of beachfront and benchland.93
The court accepted the seventy-acre parcel as the appropriate
unit, noting that some courts considered the regulatory effect
on the whole of the owner's property, while others considered
only the restricted acreage but also took into consideration the

87

See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 104 S. Ct. 53.

" 188 Cal. Rptr. 191.
89 Id. at 193.
90 Id. at 194.
•• Id. at 196-97.
92 See id. at 196 .
•, !d. at 196-97.
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availability of transferable development rights. 94 In support of
their position that the entire 110-acre parcel had to be considered, the -county quoted Penn Central's statement that
"It]aking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete ·segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has been [sic] effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character
of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights :in the parcel as a whole... .95

The California Court of Appeals correctly concluded, however,
that the Penn Centra/language suggested only that deprivation
of one property right did not necessarily entail a taking of the
property in which the right was asserted. 96 To return to the
"bundle of sticks" analogy, Justice Brennan in Penn Central
.looked at how many sticks of one bundle had been appropriated,
not at how many sticks of all or -some of the bundles owned by
the landowner had been appropriated. 97 It should also be pointed
out that Penn Central owned other neighboring properties, including tbe adjacent Pan-American Building and Commodore
Hotel, which were eligible to receive the terminal's unused development rights. 98 Yet the Penn Central opinion did not consider using as the appropriate unit of property any unit other
than the city tax block designated the landmark site. 99 In that
sense, Penn Central actually runs counter to the county's argument in Aptos Seascape that all of the landowner's contiguous
holdings must be considered.

94
See id. at 197 (comparing American Dredging v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) and Multnomah County v. Howell,
496 P.2d 235 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) with American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of
Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981) and Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County,
581 :P.2d 50 (Or. 1978)).
•s Jd. at 198 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 130 (1978)).
96
See id.
97
See 438 U.S. at 130-3 I.
•• Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (N.Y. 1977),
ajj'd, 438 U.S. at 104, liS. See also Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. L. REv. 402, 419-20 (1977-78) .
.. See 438 U.S. at 115-16.
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The California Court of Appeals found the ''most equitable
accommodation of the conflicting public and private interests at
stake in a 'takings challenge' H to be consideration of only the
restricted acreage together with any compensating development
rights. 100 The court concluded that "when governmental action
has divided contiguous property under single ownership into
separate zones, and has restricted development in one of those
zones, a provision allowing some transfer of development rights
from the restricted property or awarding compensating densities
elsewhere may preclude a finding that an unconstitutional taking
has occurred." 101 The key language here is the court's statement
that the mere existence of a provision ostensibly permitting
transfer of development rights from the restricted property may
save the governmental regulation from being a taking. Although
the trial court had concluded that the county's zoning ordinances
did not permit transfer of compensatory development rights
from the beachfront to the benchlands, the court of appeals
construed the county ordinances to permit the county to grant
Seascape compensatory densities on both its uplands and benchlands. 102 The court of appeals construed the ordinances to give
the county authority to approve a planned unit development
(PUD) 103 on the benchland with a density greater than one single
family dwelling per 6,000 square feet. 104 Based on the potential
for compensating densities, the court upheld the validity of the
open space ordinance105 and refused to find a taking resulting
from the ordinance.U16 To ensure the county's compliance with
its decision, Seascape's taking cause of action was dismissed on
condition that the county grant Seascape compensatory densities
or bear the burden in subsequent proceedings that it had made
provision for compensating densities or some other transfer of

See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
102
See id.
10
' "A [Planned Unit Development] allows the construction of buildings on a tract
free of conventional zoning so as to permit a cluster of structures and some increased
density on some portions of a tract, leaving the remainder as open space." Id. at 199.
See also Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n., 355
A.2d 550 {D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 {1976).
1"' See 188 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
10
' See id. at 199.
106 See id. at 200.
100
101
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development rights in exchange for the prohibition against building on the beachfront parcel. 107

B. Defining the Unit of "Property, in Relation to TDRs
Agins, San Diego Gas, and Aptos Seascape indicate that the
hypothetical posed in the introduction to this Article is destined
to reach the Supreme Court. When it does, the unanswered
questions from Penn Central will have to be addressed: (1) What
is the appropriate property unit? and (2) Are TDRs relevant to
the taking determination or to the just compensation determination? Both issues have already begun to perplex the lower
courts.
In a Ninth Circuit case, America Savings & Loan Association
v. County of Marin, 108 relied upon by the California Court of
Appeals in Aptos Seascape, 109 the owner of differently zoned,
but contiguous, twenty-acre and forty-eight-acre lots claimed
that the twenty-acre lot had been taken by zoning which allowed
only one multiple residential unit per five acres. 110 The county
argued that the two parcels were the unit of property by which
the taking was to be measured; the landowner claimed the twentyacre parcel was the appropriate unit. 111 The determinative factor
in defining the unit of property for the Marin court appears to
have been the treatment of the parcels by the zoning authority:
The ordinance isolates the Spit [the forty-eight-acre parcel] in
a unique zone. Appellant has presented affidavits that there
were economically viable uses for the Spit which were extinguished by the ordinance. Appellant has also presented evidence that the Spit was treated differently for zoning purposes
than other property, including the Point [the twenty-six-acre
parcel]. In sum, appellant alleges a deprivation by a nonuniform ordinance of a portion of its property which is substantial and otherwise economically viable. This tends to require that the zoning of the Spit be evaluated separately from
that of the Point for taking purposes. Yet because appellant
did not submit a development plan, it is unclear whether the

See id.
653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
09
'
Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
110
653 F.2d at 367-68.
"' Jd. at 368.
107

'

08
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Spit and Point would be treated separately at the development
stage. This fact could be crucial. The County might make
some provision for density transfers or otherwise permit shifting of benefits and burdens between the two. . . . Administrative procedures governed by local ordinances play a key role
in defining the nature of these benefits and burdens. Until
appellant submits a development plan, and the County has an
opportunity to pass on it, it is impossible to determine whether
the Point and Spit ought to be treated as one parcel or as
two. 112

The inherent difficulty caused by TDR schemes in attempting
to characterize the zoning authority's treatment of separate parcels is that the use of TDRs inextricably links together several
parcels of property which may or may not be contiguous or
under the same ownership. By their very nature, TDRs coordinate densities between separate parcels of property, thus in a
sense making such parcels a unit for planning purposes.
Penn Central triggered the dilemma of definition, but did
nothing to resolve it. Its broad suggestion that " 'taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments" 113
fs easily circumscribed by the facts of the case, as Aptos Seascape
demonstrates. 114 The Court's reasoning in this context was addressed to Penn Central's argument that the property in question
was air rights, which in turn was a segment of a single parcelthe city tax block designated as the landmark site. Penn Central
is perhaps more instructive for what it did not do: It did not
define the property to encompass other contiguous or noncontiguous property owned by Penn Central to which the development rights could be transferred.
Economic considerations should be the underlying predicate
for all taking claims. From an economic perspective, the true
impact of the governmental action on the claimant's restricted
property cannot be measured without reference to the claimant's
other unrestricted property, the presence of which may alleviate

Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).
'" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 130.
114 See text accompanying note 96 supra. New York Court of Appeals Judge Breitel
in Penn Central found that, relative to the question of "reasonable return" under due
process, it was important that there were receiving parcels in common ownership with
the landmark site on which the TDRs could be used. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 366 N.E.2d at 1277.
112
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or conceivably intensify the economic burden borne by the claimant. As the taking question ''necessarily requires a weighing of
private and public interests," 115 the balance cannot be accurately
and efficiently struck when the value of th~ claimant's remaining
interest is determined in an artificial economic vacuum that fails
to reflect the marketplace. The Penn Central majority decision
is conducive to a broad-based economic approach to defining
the property unit. Under Penn Central's approach, restrictive
land use measures are more likely to withstand taking challenges
than when tbe subject property is more narrowly defined. The
willingness of the majority to. consider the value of TDRs in
relation to the taking question itself reflects a willingness to take
all relevant economic factors into consideration ab initio in
determining whether a taking has occurred.
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central and the Court's subsequent decisions in Kaiser Aetna, PruneYard and Monsanto suggest a different outcome, however. In order to avoid the
definitional dilemma, the taking issue is determined without
reference to a permissible/impermissiple percentage of economic
return, which in turn obviates the need for d~fining tbe property
unit on which the return is b~sed, The factors which still must
be taken into account to evaluate when a regulation effects a
taking are " 'the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its iJiterference with reasonable investment
backed expectations.' " 116 T)lus far, most of the Court's elaboration of this standard has focused on the character of the
governmental action. Kaiser Aetna and particularly Loretto have
established that a physical invasion, no matter how limited, is
per se a taking. 117 Within this c~tegory, Justice Rehnquist might
add from his Penn C(Jntral diss.ent that nllisance regulation .and
zoning which applies over a broad section of land, thereby
Hsecur[il!g] .an average reciprocity of advantage," are governmental actions of a character that constitute an exception to the
taking prohibition.~~~

"' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261.
m Ruckelshau§ y. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 28621 2875 (1984) (quoting PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
17
'
See Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Ta,kings: A Decisiqna/ Model for the
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv, 465 (1983). "" 4~8 J:j.S. at l47 (Rehnquist, ,J., .dissenting).

1985]

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

781

It is clear from Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent that he

views deprivation of property, for purposes of the taking clause,
as the deprivation of a property right or rights, not as the
deprivation of a degree of economic return on some undefined
physical unit of real property:
The term [property] is not used in the "vulgar and untechnical
sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen
exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead, it] ... denotes[s]
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical· thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of
it . ... The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort
of interest the citizen may possess." 119

Monsanto extends this reasoning to the conclusion that deprivation of a single property right, the right to exclude others,
may be a taking without regard to the economic value of any
remaining rights in the property. 120
Ostensibly, then, under Justice Rehnquist's approach there
is no need for definition of the property unit. Yet the problem
resurfaces in another context: the two unexplored factors of
"economic impact" and "interference with reasonable invest,.
ment backed expectation.'' 121 As first formulated in Penn Central
these were not separate and distinct factors; rather, interference
with investment-backed expectations was the most significant
aspect of economic impact. 122 Indeed, the two factors are inextricably linked in Monsanto. Having concluded that the FIFRA
conferred a reasonable investment-backed expectation of confidentiality in the submitted data, the Court reasoned that the
right to exclude others was so central to a trade secret and its
economic value that destruction of this right alone was tantamount to a taking of the trade secret, 123 The remaining uses for

/d. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (emphasis in original)). Not surprisingly, General
Motors is again quoted in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.: " 'Governmental action short
of acquistion of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to
deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a
taking.' " 104 S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting 323 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added)).
120
See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
121 See 438 U.S. at 124.
122 ld.
m See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2878.
119
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the trade data were deemed "irrelevant" to the "economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property right." 124
Monsanto holds less hope for the future of TDR schemes
than did Penn Central. Under Justice Brennan's approach in
Penn Central, Monsanto's loss of competitive advantage and
potential profits probably would have been insufficient for a
taking because the data did have vestigial uses of some value.
Those remaining uses would not have been irrelevant, but would
have been determinative of whether a taking had occurred. Monsanto's more stringent approach toward regulation, if applied in
the land use context, comes very close to contradicting the axiom
that regulatory deprivation of property's most beneficial use does
not render the regulation unconstitutional. 125 Given the impermanence of zoning, the requirement that there be interference
with a reasonable investment-backed expectation could be viewed
as militating against a proliferation of successful taking challenges. Yet, in Kaiser Aetna the Corps of Engineers' approval
for a dredging permit was viewed by Justice Rehnquist as leading
to "fruition" of a right to exclude others from the property. 126
In any event, the "property right" approach leaves little room
for TDRs to redeem the zoning measure. This approach focuses
narrowly on the right which has been taken, without regard
either to remaining rights in the property or to what benefits
might be conferred in return for the restrictions.
In short, Penn Central poses no immediate barriers to TDR
land planning techniques that impose severe restrictions on a
single parcel of property in a planning area. The opinion on its
face supports looking at the restricted parcel in conjunction with
the value of the TDRs to determine the extent of economic
interference. Even if the ordinance were to deprive the landowner
of all reasonable return on the property, therefore, it is conceivable that the TDRs might redeem the ordinance from a taking
perspective. Moreover, in its underlying receptiveness to a broadbased economic analysis of the impact of the regulation, Penn
Central leaves open the economically sound possibility that the
regulatory impact could be determined with reference to all of
the landowner's contiguous property that functions as an eco-

124
125
126

Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
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nomic unit in response to the regulation. Under either analysis,
a taking is unlikely to occur unless the landowner is deprived of
all or almost all of the defined property's reasonable use and
the TDRs fail to have a reasonable, ascertainable value. However, if Kaiser Aetna, PruneYard and Monsanto are seen as a
reformulation of taking jurisprudence along the lines of the Penn
Central dissent, the property right, not the property unit, is
determinative of a taking challenge. If the right itself is central
to the type of property at issue, its deprivation may be enough
to constitute a taking, without regard to any remaining uses, to
other economically related property, or to the availability of
TDRs. Given Monsanto's recent emphasis on loss of profit
potential, deprivation of the right to develop property stands a
better chance of protection under the taking clause. With TDRs
relegated to the issue of just compensation, zoning prohibitions
against any development may not withstand a taking challenge
under this approach.

C. The Second Issue: Are TDRs a Panacea for
a Taking, or (Un)just Compensation?
Transferable development rights can be viewed as a hybrid
of the police power and eminent domain, a synthesis of regulation and compensation. 127 By granting TDRs, has the zoning
authority avoided a taking or has it obviated the issue by providing remuneration for lost rights? In Penn Central, Justice
Brennan assumed that the value of the TDRs was relevant to
determining whether a taking had occurred; Justice Rehnquist
found a taking without reference to the TDRs and would have
remanded for a determination of their value as just compensation.128 Neither Justice explained his underlying assumption as
to the relevance of the TDRs to the two-part inquiry of "taking"
and "just compensation." The question is certainly not academic. TDRs appear much less likely to be an effective barrier
to a taking challenge under the rubric of just compensation than
under the multifactor concept of "reasonable use." Although
much has been written on regulatory schemes which may best

127
121

SeeM. GITELMAN, LAND UsE 465-69 (3d ed. 1982).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 152 (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
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insure the economic viability of TDRs, 129 the fact remains that
even the most carefully tailored TDR scheme provides no direct
monetary compensation and depends upon market factors beyond a zoning authority's control. The Supreme Court's analysis
in Agins and San Diego demonstrates that nonmonetary remedies
for a taking will be closely scrutinized. 130
Few cases other than Penn Central have grappled with constitutional challenges to TDRs, and these decisions provide little,
if any, insight into the taking/compensation dichotomy. The two
lower court cases from New York on the constitutionality of
TDRs, the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Penn
Central131 and that court's pre-Penn Central decision in Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 132 are confined to a
due process analysis. In French, the New York Court of Appeals
refused to recognize an action for compensation predicated on
a regulatory taking. 133 The proper due process inquiry, according
to the court, was whether the zoning ordinance was unreasonable
in that it destroyed the economic value of the property. 134 In this
regard, the court stated that the TDRs "may not be disregarded
in determining whether the ordinance has destroyed the economic
value of the underlying property." 135 The court never had to
confront the eminent domain issue of whether the value of the
TDRs became relevant initially to the existence of a taking, or
secondarily as compensation. Chief Judge Breitel found that the
city's downzoning of the parks to zero density, coupled 'vith
"floating development rights, utterly unusable until they could
be attached to some accommodating real property,'' was a deprivation of property without due process of law . 136 The Chief
Judge contrasted with approval the "development bank" or so-

129 See, e.g., Delaney, Kominers & Gordon, TDR Redux: A Second Generation of
Practical Legal Courses, IS URB. LAw. 593 (1983); Richman & Kendeg, Transfer Development Rights-A Pragmatic View, 9 URB. LAw. 571 (1977).
130 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255; Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County
of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191.
131 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271.
132 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976).
m See 350 N.E.2d at 385.
134
See id. at 387.
135
136

ld.
Id. at 388.
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called "Chicago Plan" 137 by which a State is able to condemn
development rights and pay directly for them in exercising its
eminent domain power. 13s
In the New York Court of Appeals decision in Penn Central, 139 Chief Judge Breitel reaffirmed the French holding that
due process, not the taking clause, provided the framework for
evaluating a claim of inverse condemnation. 140 In an innovative
opinion, the court upheld the landmark preservation ordinance
and its TDR program. 141 Ostensibly distinguishing the French
case, Chief Judge Breitel noted that the ."transferable abovethe-surface development rights which, because they may be attached to specific parcels of property, some already owned by
Penn Central or its affiliates, may be considered as part of the
owner's return on the terminal property." 142 One commentator
has pointed out that the ownership of recipient parcels by a
landowner with TDRs is a slender reed upon which to turn a
due process clause. 143 Under this analysis, one rationale for the
differing results in French and Penn Central is that in French
no residual return was possible after the downzoning to zero
density of the parks, so that the TDRs were the only possibility
of return. 144 The most innovative section of the French opinion
attempts to define the "reasonable return" necessary to save the
regulation from a due process claim. The opinion concluded that
the base for computing a reasonable return should exclude the
"social increment" of value attributable to the government's
activities rather than to private investment. 145
One recent lower court case has squarely confronted the issue
of whether TDRs should be categorized as economic return
relevant to the taking question or, assuming a taking is found
without reference to the TDRs' value, as just compensation. In

This approach to preserving landmarks in "high development" areas was developed in Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1971-72).
1
"
See 350 N.E.2d at 388.
9
"
366 N.E.2d 1271.
"" See id. at 1274.
1
" See id. at 1271.
1
" Id. at 1273.
10
See Costonis, supra note 98, at 421.
1
"
Id. at 420.
1
' ' See 366 N.E.2d at 1276.
137
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Dufour v. Montgomery County Council, 146 a county ordinance
rezoned much of the agricultural land as "agricultural reserve,"
downzoning the reserve from one dwelling per five acres to one
dwelling per twenty-five acres. 147 Each landowner in the agricultural reserve, the sending zone, was assigned transferable development rights of one residential unit per five acres which could
be sold to developers in designated receiving areas. 148 The county
established a development rights bank 149 to purchase and sell
development rights until sufficient receiving areas are designated
to establish a strong private market. 150 Holding that an exercise
of police power could effectuate a taking for which compensation must be provided, the Montgomery County Circuit Court
concluded, even without consideration of the TDRs, that the
downzoning was not tantamount to denial of "all reasonable
use" of the property .151
In an alternative finding, the Dufour court determined that
the TDRs buttressed its holding that a taking had not occurred,
even though at the time of the downzoning no receiving areas
had been designated, 152 no interim development rights bank had
been established and the value of the TDRs was in all likelihood
"substantially below 'just compensation' for the diminution in
value." 153 Noting the apparent controversy over whether TDRs
should be evaluated as an alleviation of the property owner's
burden or as just compensation, 154 the court accepted without

Dufour v. Montgomery County Council, No. 56964, slip op. at 15 (Montgomery
County Cir. Ct. Md. Jan. 20, 1983).
147
For a description of the Montgomery County ordinance, see U.S.D.A., 5 Farmline 6 (May 1984). See also Duncan, supra note 1, at 122.
148
For a more detailed analysis of the Montgomery County plan, see Duncan,
supra note 1, at 122-24.
149
See Costonis, supra note 137, at 620-31.
'"' Duncan, supra note 1, at 123.
'" See No. 56964, slip op. at 15.
2
"
The court, however, did not entirely rule out the possibility that it might be
necessary to have a fact finding hearing on whether a temporary taking had occurred
before designation of the receiving areas. See id. slip op. at 19.
'" Id. slip op. at 17-18.
154
The court, in addition to noting Justice Rehnquist's position in the Penn Central
dissent, erroneously cited French for the proposition that TDRs were relevant to the
threshold taking issue. See id. The French decision utilized a due process analysis and
explicitly refused to hold that overregulation could be framed as a taking claim. See text
accompanying notes 133-38 supra.
146
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further analysis Justice Brennan's reasoning in Penn Central that
TDRs were relevant to the impact of the regulation. 155 Relying
on its other holding that even without reference to the TDRs no
taking had occurred, the court decided not to receive evidence
on the fair market value of the TDRs. 156 Clearly, the court felt
a need for further guidance from the appellate courts in computing the value of TDRs. If, indeed, recent Supreme Court
cases demonstrate a movement toward Justice Rehnquist's approach to the taking issue, a more troublesome prospect is that
TDRs would be deemed irrelevant to the threshold issue of
whether a taking has occurred. As discussed earlier, 157 even the
most carefully planned TDR ordinance may run afoul of the
strictly interpreted mandate of just compensation. From an economic, legal and public policy perspective, the value of TDRs
fits much less comfortably within the rubric of "just compensation" than within that of a "taking."
An economic analysis of Justice Rehnquist's position in Penn
Central is particularly appropriate since his criticism of the majority's approach echoes Professor Michelman's economics-based
critique of traditional taking jurisprudence:
[T]o determine compensability one is expected to focus on the
particular "thing" injuriously affected and to inquire what
proportion of its value is destroyed by the measure in question.
If this proportion is so large as to approach totality, compensation is due; otherwise, not. It is not easy to see the relevance
of this particular inquiry to just decision.
The difficulty is aggravated when the question is raised of
how to define the "particular thing" whose value is to furnish
the denominator of the fraction. Let us suppose that I own a
tract of unimproved land. Is the land necessarily one "thing"
for this purpose, or might it be several? Can it, for example, ever
be regarded as geographically divided into more than one thing?
Evidently, it can be; for, if we imagine government's practically
forbidding me any use of a geographically determined quarter
of my farm, it is not likely that the obligation to compensate can

"' No. 56964, slip op. at 16.
,,. See id. slip op. at 18.
"' See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
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be escaped by the argument that only a quarter of the value of
the "thing" has been destroyed. 158

Reformulating the traditional diminution of value test to
better reflect its purpose in fairly distributing the benefits and
burdens within society, Michelman states:
All this suggests that the common way of stating the test under
discussion-in terms of a vaguely located critical point on a
sliding scale-is misleading (though certainly a true representation of the language repeatedly used by Holmes). The customary labels-magnitude of the harm test, or diminution of
value test-obscure the test's foundations by conveying the
idea that it calls for an arbitrary pinpointing of a critical
proportion (probably lying somewhere between fifty and one
hundred percent). More sympathetically perceived, however,
the test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it does
not ask "how much," but rather (like the physical-occupation
test) it asks "whether or not": whether or not the measure in
question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the
claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation. 159

In Monsanto, PruneYard, Kaiser Aetna and Penn Central,
the Court has stated that three factors are relevant to a taking:
''the character of the governmental action, its economic impact,

158 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1192-93 (1967) (emphasis
in original) (footnotes omitted). Justice Rehnquist's approach is criticized by Professor
Michelman:
It might thus appear that the scope of the "thing" subject to devaluation
is to be defined by the incidence of the measure itself. But if that is so,
will it not begin to seem as though all use restrictions are totally destructive
of value? Suppose I am forbidden to remove gravel from my land, or to
use my land for a foundry. Inasmuch as mining rights are well recognized,
divisible interests in land, and inasmuch as "rights" to particular surface
uses have come to be recognized as species of "property" under the label
of "easement" or "servitude," why not say that my land consists of two
"things"-mining rights and surface rights, or foundry rights and residueand that the relevant denominator in testing a regulation which impinges
only on mining rights or foundry rights is the value of those rights-which
the regulation totally destroys? Why, in other words, should a regulation's
own scope sometimes define the geographical, but not the functional, extent
of the "thing" said to be regulated?
Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
9
"
Id. at 1233.
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and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations."160 Any evaluation of the economic impact of the regulation is necessarily incomplete without inclusion of the value of
TDRs in the taking computation. Whatever might be the economic wisdom or lack thereof in excluding the value of postregulation vestigial rights from the economic tally, it is unjustifiably
myopic to exclude the economic value of TDRs that relate directly to the economic value of the specific property right allegedly being taken. For example, even if the Rehnquist approach
would exclude the economic value of remaining uses of the
restricted property (e.g., recreational, agricultural) from the economic impact computation, why exclude the market value of
TDRs in relation to the economic loss which the TDRs are
designed to offset?
With reference to the relatively unexplored element of "interference with reasonable investment-backed expectation," the
Court will be confronted with a traditional zoning analysis.
Under such analysis, absent perhaps some governmental action
which reasonably induced good faith reliance either on a right
to continued development as in Kaiser Aetna161 or on utilization
of profit potential as existed in Monsanto, 162 there are no vested
rights to develop based on reliance on any preexisting zoning
scheme. 163 Whether as a general rule there exists a reasonable
investment-backed expectation of some development, no matter
how minimal, remains to be seen. Implicit in the concept of land
use regulation is the premise that property rights are not absolute. Of all the so-called property rights, a right to develop one's
property is the most likely source of conflict and, concomitantly,
the right most likely to necessitate compromise. It is no longer
reasonable to expect one's property rights to extend "from the
center usque ad coelum." 164 A theory of taking jurisprudence
which reinstates the right to develop as fundamental or para-

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2875 (quoting 447 U.S. at 83).
See 444 U.S. 164.
162 See 104 S. Ct. at 2877-79.
163
See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,
542 P.2d 237 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional
Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
164
Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
1
"'
161
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mount fails to reflect the modern realities of land use regulation
or the expectations of the property owner.
From a legal perspective, the better analysis is to consider
TDRs in relation to both the taking issue and the just compensation issue. In a regulatory taking two related constitutional
challenges may be made-deprivation of due process and taking
without just compensation. 165 The second challenge consists of
two distinct components-"taking" and "just compensation."
Relegating TDRs to the just compensation evaluation leads to
an anomalous result. The question common to both challenges, whether the landowner may still make a reasonable return on
the property166-would include consideration of the TDRs' value
under the due process analysis but not under a taking analysis.
For purposes of due process analysis there is only a one-part
inquiry-whether there is a reasonable return-to which the
value of TDRs is either relevant or irrelevant. There is no second
inquiry under which the TDRs may be considered. To totally
exclude the value of TDRs from a due process analysis appears
unjustifiable, yet inclusion of this value would result in a more
expansive due process analysis of economic impact than permitted under the taking clause.
Justice Rehnquist's criticism of Justice Brennan's approach
remains: If a taking is judged by the diminution in value of the
property as a whole, what is the appropriate property unit in
any given case? A solution to this issue may be found in the
Court's formulation of the "Ben A von doctrine" of judicial
review for constitutional facts. This doctrine was developed in
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 167 where a water
company claimed that the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission's valuation of company property was so low as to be
confiscatory. 168 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized the
usual substantial evidence standard for review of the facts relevant to the confiscation issue. 169 The United States Supreme
Court, however, held that this scope of review was too narrow:

1
"

166
167

168
169

See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
See text accompanying notes 26, 33 supra.
253 u.s. 287 (1920).
See id. at 288.
Id.
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In all such cases, if the owner claims a confiscation of his
property will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity
for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the
due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment. 170

The Ben A von holding that agencies cannot finally determine
constitutional facts has not been followed since 1936 and, in
some cases, may even have been contradicted. 171 Although the
doctrine has never been overruled, the Supreme Court has declared ''it is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate
factual questions on the ground that constitutional rights are
involved." 172 To the extent that the Ben A von doctrine of judicial
review is still alive, it mandates full review of constitutional facts
only where deprivation of personal, rather than property, rights
is at issue. 173 As Justice Brandeis has stated, "when dealing with
property a much more liberal rule [of review in favor of the
agency] applies. " 174
Drawing upon the Ben A von doctrine in its present form, it
is perhaps time that the Supreme Court disengage itself from
"ad hoc factual" inquiries where property, rather than personal,
rights are involved. As ratemaking became more and more factually complex, the Court saved itself from the quagmire of
active judicial review of facts and deferred to agency findings.
The Court should take a similar approach to taking cases. Taking jurisprudence is relatively unique in that the Court continues
to engage in broad factual inquiries although property rights,
rather than personal rights, are implicated. Greater deference to
the planning agency's findings as to the appropriate unit of
property would serve the interests of judicial economy, yet judicial review of the ultimate issue of whether a taking had
occurred would be preserved. Moreover, regardless of whether
TDRs are held to be relevant to the taking or to the just
compensation issue, the Court will at some point find itself

170

/d. at 289.

171

See B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 767-69 (2d ed. 1984).

Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951).
See B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 171, at 629-32.
174
See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936)
(Brandeis, J ., concurring).
m

173
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obligated under its present scope of review to ascertain the
economic value of TDRs in a limitless range of economic situations. When that occurs, deference to the local planning agency's expertise should be effected through reviewing facts under
the traditional substantial evidence standard.
CONCLUSION

The Court appears to be moving toward a taking jurisprudence which would elevate certain select property rights, and
potentially the "right to develop," above other rights and above
the needs of the community. This approach invites conflict between standards for a taking violation and those for a due
process violation. It focuses on the nature of the property right,
rather than on the true economic impact of the regulation and
the public policy concerns for preservation. Although the countervailing "diminution in value" approach necessitates some definition of the property taken, such factual matters may best be
left, under either approach, to the expertise of the local planning
agency. Regardless of which approach prevails, at some point
the Court will find itself confronted with a complex evaluation
of the economic value of TDRs. It is difficult to posit a question
which calls more for judicial deference to the expertise of the
local planning agency.
TDRs are an innovative advance in preservation techniques.
When well planned and implemented, TDRs promise an equitable distribution of the costs of preservation among all of those
who would benefit from it. Farmland, landmarks and scenic
open areas are "public goods" like clean air and clean water;
without regulation of the allocation of preservation costs, these
costs will not fall proportionally on all those who benefit from
preservation. 175 If TDRs do not fit neatly into our traditional
concepts of police power versus eminent domain, regulation
versus compensation, the fault may not lie with TDRs as much
as with the traditional concepts. Land use is indeed one of the
areas, like medicine and technology, in which innovation has
rendered many legal precepts inadequate or obsolete. There is a
need for greater flexibility in taking jurisprudence, and this need

"' See Davis & Karnien, Externalities and the Quality of Air and Water, in EcoAm. AND WATER POLLUTION 12-19 (\V. Walker ed. 1969).
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can be met through increased deference to the difficult economic
and administrative findings made by local planning agencies.
The present approach of the Court toward a hierarchy of property rights suggests there will be less flexibility and, accordingly,
less of a future for innovative land use planning.

